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difficulties. These led to lower export volume,
reducing total real export revenues from copper, by
1985, to below 30 per cent of 1970/72 levels (Table 2).
In an economy which depended upon copper for
93 per cent of its exports and up to 40 per cent of its
GDP in the early 1970s, these events were momentous.
Real domestic income was cut by one quarter in 1975.
This was inescapable. The interesting question,
however, is whether the stagnation over the following
decade was also an inevitable consequence of the
copper price fall. Would alternative policies have been
capable of returning Zambia to a growth path - albeit
from a lower income base? Answering this question
involves an examination of the policy response by the
Zambian Government (GRZ) to the copper price fall,
and to the balance of payments problems so created;
further it involves asking whether more appropriate
policies were available (i.e. techically and politically
feasible) which held promise of 'better' results.
From a fairly comfortable position on its overall
balance of payments in 1974, Zambia swung sharply
into deficit on both current and capital accounts the
following year. The former amounted to approximately
30 per cent of GDP (Table 3), and necessitated urgent
action. In the short term the government had few
alternatives to financing the deficit by increasing its
borrowing from bilateral and multilateral sources and
by running down its reserves of foreign exchange. The
latter were reduced to less than K100 mn - sufficient
at that time to finance only about eight weeks of
imports - yet this source provided sufficient finance
to cover only about 10 per cent of the current account
deficit. Accordingly, the disbursement of medium and
long-term loans increased four-fold in 1975, with the
remainder of the overall deficit being covered mainly
by incurring arrears on interest payable on earlier
loans.
This short-term strategy, inevitable though it was,
itself presented fresh dangers for the longer term. Any
large increase in external indebtedness carries the
implication of enhanced future debt-service outflows,
which themselves need to be financed. It was a
strategy, therefore, which would be containable only if
the fundamental external earnings/expenditure balance
were to be corrected fairly quickly. In the event, this
proved difficult to achieve. The decline in the price of
copper turned out to be sustained, rather than to
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Introduction
It would be difficult for the first two decades of any
country's post-independence history to stand in
starker contrast than is the case with Zambia. The
economy grew rapidly during the 1960s and early
1970s, with high and rising copper exports providing
the basis for buoyant government revenues and
expenditures. In 1975, however, the long period of
strong copper prices came to an end, reflecting, inter
a/ia, growing excess world supplies. The price fell from
over 90 cents per lb in 1974, to around 50 cents in 1975.
Zambia's terms of trade were halved over the same
period. The price has not, since then, substantially
recovered.
The pattern and level of subsequent production are
summarised in Table 1. Output, valued in constant
prices, peaked in 1974, and remained stable at that
level through 1985. However, after taking account of
Zambia's terms of trade, it can be seen that real
income declined sharply over those ten years. An even
more dismal picture is revealed after allowing for
population growth: real income per capita declined
massively, so that, by 1985, it was scarcely more than
half the level reached in 1970. This article addresses
three main questions:
Why did this happen, and could it have been
avoided?
What adjustment measures were introduced by the
Zambian authorities and what have been their
effects?
What were the causes of Zambia's subsequent
rejection of policy reform?
Causes of Zambia's Economic Decline
The enormous magnitude of the fall in the copper
price is the clear cause of most of Zambia's present
difficulties. The average real price of copper on the
London Metal Exchange fell by one quarter over
1974/76, as compared with 1970/72. Table 2 shows
that this real price decline continued over the
following decade, so that by 1984/85 it stood at only
40 per cent of its real 1970/72 value. The effects of the
price decline were exacerbated in the Zambian case by
declining ore grades and technical production
1970 /974 /975 1980 /983 1984 /985
Agriculture 136.1 150.5 157.0 166.4 172.3 181.9 198.7
Mining 460,3 474.3 427.9 398.7 446.5 402.8 381.4
Industry 235.0 339.4 345.0 326.8 346.7 349.7 366.4
Other 437.1 509.7 508.2 525.9 506.9 500.8 513.0
GDP (market prices) 1268.5 1473.9 1438.1 1417.8 1472.4 1435.2 1459.5
Plus T/T
adj ust men a - -104.7 -387.2 -367.3 -427.1 -350.0 -360.0
GDYh 1268.5 1369.2 1049.9 1050.5 1045.3 1085.2 1099.5
Population (000's) 4159 4700 4846 5647 6285 6500 6725
GDPpercapita(K) 305 314 297 251 200 191 190
GDYpercapita(K) 305 291 217 186 166 167 163
Table 1
Notes: a Rough estimates for 1984 and 1985.
b Gross domestic income: this is equal to GDP plus adjustment for variations in the terms of trade.
Sources: Calculated on the basis of data in World Bank 1984, Tables 2.02 and 2.04 and World Bank, 1986a,
Tables 2.02 and 2.04.
Table 2
Notes: "Price as quoted at London Metal Exchange, expressed in US cents per pound, converted to 1982 constant dollars.
h (Col (1) x Col (2)) / (1970/72 Col 1 x Col 2) x 100
Source: World Bank 1986a, Table 3 (Columns 1 and 2).
Gross Domestic Product and Income (total and per capita), by Type of Economic Activity
(millions of constant 1970 Kwacha)
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Copper Exports and Prices 1970-85
Year Exports LME Copper Price Export value us
«000 tonnes) % 0fJ970/7b(I) (2)
1970/72 (average) 677 148 loo
l974/76 (average) 687 109 75
1979/81 (average) 609 87 53
1982 607 67 41
1983 551 74 41
1984 530 60 32
1985 479 61 29
Table 3
represent a short-term fluctuation which was
subsequently reversed. Thus, real export revenues
continued to fall. Furthermore, the rising price of oil
exacerbated the difficulties on current account: the
real value of exports (i.e. adjusted for changes in
import prices) was halved between 1974 and 1975 -
and it was halved again by 1983 [see Table 4].
In principle, when a payments deficit appears to
become endemic, rather than transitory, a government
confronts a range of instruments which can be used to
move the economy back towards equilibrium.
Elementary theory demonstrates that an improvement
in the current account of the balance of payments
requires that domestic absorption of resources (C + I)
be reduced relative to income. In circumstances where
Summary Balance of Payments, 1974-85
(US$ mn)
Note: Includes arrears on external payments and on debt service, reserve changes, gold revaluation and SDR allocations.
Sources: World Bank 1984 Table 2.1, 1986a, Tables 5 and 3.01.
income is not growing, consumption or investment or
both must fall, if more resources are to be released for
export, or if imports are to be reduced. Alternatively,
'adjustment through growth' - via export promotion
or import substitution - would allow correction of
the balance of payments deficits without concomitant
reductions in domestic expenditure. In most countries,
however, this can only make sense as part of a long-
term strategy; and it is not much help as a palliative
when deficits represent a sizeable portion of GDP. In
Zambia's case (though such a strategy may be judged
desirable per se) it was particularly unpromising as a
solution to its payments problem. This, it should be
recalled, was caused by a 25 per cent fall in current
income. Yet, the physical amount of production -
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f974 1975 1978-80
('average)
¡981 ¡982 1983 1984 1985
Current items
Exports 1397 800 1259 1000 923 992 883 829
(of which copper) (1300) (732) (1014) (866) (799) (859) (723) (646)
Imports 793 945 989 1238 1158 839 742 752
Trade balance 604 -145 270 -238 -235 153 141 77
Services (net) -538 -536 -327 -468 -373 -357 -394 -217
(of which interest) (126) (117) (191) (210) (250) (252) (277) (121)
Current transfers (net) -61 -61 -84 -157 -91 -55 -51 -51
Current account balance 5 -742 -141 -863 -699 -259 -304 -191
Capital items
Grants 9 5 30 27 40 36 53 71
Medium and long term loans (net) 105 382 269 208 258 104 212 209
Net IMF flows - 23 96 368 -57 64 76 -97
Other capital, plus
errors/ornissionsa
-107 174 -297 213 -19 -207 -401 .574
Overa//balance 12 -158 -43 -47 -477 -262 -364 -582
Arrears (- means reduction) 158 43 47 477 -51 -118 567
Debt relief/Exceptional
financing - - - 313 482 IS
Memorandum
Current A/C deficit/GDP (%) - 29.7 4.2 22.1 18.1 7.7 11.1 8.1
Table 4
and therefore the aggregate need for imports - was
the same post- and pre-1975. The process of restoring
the 25 per cent value loss via import-constrained
production increases was surely always a hopeless task
- at least over the short-to-medium terms.
An alternative set of instruments to those focusing
upon domestic expenditure variables is provided by
the external sector itself. The two broad category
choices concern policies which affect prices, via, for
example, manipulation of the exchange rate, or of
import duties, and those which directly affect
quantities by introducing administrative controls on
imports, or on access to foreign exchange. Again in
principle, in a world of flexible coefficients and high
substitution elasticities for the use of factors in
production and products in consumption, freely
adjusting the domestic/international price ratio in
response to fluctuations in foreign or domestic
demand should be enough to preserve payments
equilibrium by encouraging a greater domestic
production of tradeable goods. But this is so only in
the context of small changes in either price or
demand.1 Even with flexible coefficients, valuation
changes of the magnitude experienced by Zambia's
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Income and Expenditure 1970-83
(millions of constant 1970 Kwacha)
Note: Defined as exports, in current prices, divided by the import price index (1970 = 1.0).
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Stat istics, and GRZ documentation for Consultative Group.
major export commodity could not be easily or
speedily compensated by policies restricted to
operation on relative prices. This is true both as
regards the required additional production of import-
substitutes or of exports. For example, in terms of the
availability of technology, resources and market size,
a switch from foreign to domestic sources of supply is
simply not a medium-term possibility for much of
Zambian mining and manufacturing industry. Equally,
given the uncertainties surrounding the copper
industry, adjustment through export production
would mainly have to comprise increases in so-called
'non-traditional' exports - particularly agricultural
and manufactured goods. Yet, even high supply
elasticities in these sectors could hardly deliver
sufficient production response strongly or quickly
enough to replace copper losses - even taking a ten-
year view.
Of course, even under the above circumstances, a
devaluation can still achieve adjustment via the
changes to the distribution of income (away from
consumers, towards producers) which it imposes. The
For further discus sion of this point see Harvey's article in this issue.
1970 /974 /975 1976 1980 /983
Gross domestic income 1268.5 1369.2 1050.9 1053.5 1050.5 1052.0
(Plus) Imports 470.5 488.3 454.9 339.4 291.0 157.3
(Less) Capacity to importa 685.4 602.0 296.0 383.7 261.3 153.5
(Less) Statistical discrepancy -0.1 -69.9 -47.1 12.9 -10.2
Gross domestic expcnditurc 1053.6 1255.6 279.7 1056.3 1067.4 1066.0
Gross domestic consumption 692.8 760.1 852.4 827.5 861.4 930.7
Government 198.5 259.0 287.2 291.9 272.5 241.6
Private 494.3 501.1 565.2 535.6 588.9 689.2
Gross domestic investment 360.8 495.5 427.3 228.8 206.0 135.3
Fixed capital formation 372.3 358.5 393.5 237.0 176.0 119.3
Changes in stocks -I 1.5 137.0 33.8 -8.2 30.0 16.0
/974 /975 /976 /978 1980 1981 1982 1983 ¡984 1985
Total expenditure (current
Kwacha, millions)
(constant 1975 Kwacha,
millions)
612.2
663.3
855.0
855.0
77 1,5
678.5
815.4
497.8
1302.0
608.1
1388.6
553.2
1470.6
520.4
1442.1
436.6
1621.0
450.7
2945.7
649.4
As percent of total expenditure
Wages 20.5 17.9 22.9 23.2 19.7 25.4 24.2 27.9 28.2 18.4
Debt service 11.6 8.9 13.7 19.2 14.3 14.1 15.7 17.1 17.9 28.5
Total current expenditure 72.0 71.3 78.9 79.4 83.1 88.6 84.5 86.3 83.6 84.5
Capital expenditure 28.0 28.7 21.1 20.6 16.9 11.4 15.5 13.7 16.4 15.5
Tax revenue 97.5 45.7 49.6 59.2 54.0 53.7 50.6 65.3 61.1 47.0
Total revenue and grants 112.8 55.7 61.0 71.7 62.1 61.3 59.0 74.2 71.1 57.5
Deficit -12.8 44.3 39.0 28.3 37.9 38.6 41.0 25.9 28.4 42.6
Financed by;
External loans 9.5 11.8 6.9 7.4 10.6 20.1 13.1 10.7 7.9 7.0
Bank of Zambia -27.0 27.7 24.6 15.8 22.3 12.2 33.3 8.0 11.7 6.4
Othera - 4.8 7.5 5.1 5.0 6.4 -5.5 7.2 8.8 20.7
As percent of GDP
Total expenditure 32.3 54.0 41.2 36.4 43.2 40.3 40.9 34.5 32.9 46.5
Tax revenue 31.5 24.7 20.4 21.6 23.3 21.6 20.7 22.5 20.1 21.9
Total revenue and grants 36.5 30.1 25.1 26.1 26.8 24.7 24.1 25.6 23.5 26.7
Deficit -4.2 23.9 16.1 10.3 16.4 15.6 16,8 8.9 9.3 19.8
Borrowing from BOZ -8.7 15.0 10.1 5.8 9.6 4.9 13.6 2.8 3.8 6.9
Government savings 13.2 -8.4 -7.4 -2.8 -9.1 -11.0 -10.4 -4.2 -3.9 -9.3
Table 5 Key Features of Central Government Finances 1975-85
Note: Includes debt relief in 1982, 1983 and 1985.
Sources: Annual Financial Reports, GRZ, and World Bank 1986a, Table 5.01. CSO: Implicit Gross Domestic Expenditure
deflator, from national accounts.
net effects are often difficult to anticipate, since,
ultimately, the incomes of the two groups are mutually
dependent. But, initially, at least such re-distribution
tends to promote export production and to reduce
import demand. This, however, has as much to do
with adjusting via reductions in consumption, as it has
to do with the size of the relevant supply elasticities.
Similar points can be made about direct controls upon
foreign exchange, or imports. In principle, such
controls allow the possibility of eliminating the deficit
by reducing the import of unnecessary' items. This
instrument allows much greater selectivity than is
possible with the use of the exchange rate alone. The
dangers, however, are well known: inefficiencies in
allocation causing production bottlenecks; over-
valuation of the exchange rate reducing incentives to
export; and the difficulty of dealing with large
payments deficits - such as that in Zambia - via
import controls alone.
GRZ's response to the payments deficit involved use
of each of the above instruments. The particular
combination of measures adopted, however, did not
succeed in eliminating the deficit. As shown in Table 4,
the increased severity of the import constraint reduced
domestic expenditure after 1975. The table seems to
suggest that the entire burden of reduction fell on
investment. Consumption, on the other hand,
continued to rise. The table does not, however, allow
for population growth. Such incorporation reveals
that consumption per capita had, by 1983, fallen by
16 per cent in comparison with 1975.2 Nevertheless the
cuts in investment were very sharp indeed (80 per cent
over 1974/83) and this would have drastically reduced
the possibility of a return to economic growth, even
from the depressed levels of the mid-1970s.
The behaviour of government spending is of particular
interest. Its main constituents over the period are
shown in Table 5. It should be noted that total
spending by central government was halved in real
terms between 1975 and 1983/84, but that current
spending fell much less sharply. (Although real wages
fell, debt service rose to take their place in budgetary
It is interesting to note that this fall in living standards, indicated by
the macroeconomic data, almost exactly corresponds to the fall in
the real value of the government minimum wage over the same
period, shown in Table 7.
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US$ per Kwacha
Urban CPI
Low Income High Income
Annual % change in CPI
Low Income High Income
1970 1.40
1975 1.55 100.0 100.0 10.1 8.5
1980 1.27 202.9 189.4 ¡1.7 11.9
1981 1.15 231.3 209.1 ¡4.0 10.4
¡982 1.08 260.2 236.7 12.5 13.2
¡983 0.80 311.2 278.6 ¡9.6 17.7
¡984 0.56 373.5 336.8 20.0 20.9
1985 0.37 513.5 455.0 37.5 35.1
1986 July-Sept 0.16 778.4 707.2 51.6 55.4
1987 April 0.05 938.3 850.5 21.0 21.0
May 0.125
terms.) Capital expenditure was severely cut - falling
by 70 per cent over the period. The public sector deficit
was higher than one-third of total spending for most of
these years. The deficit had emerged primarily owing
to reduced mining revenues, and was financed partly
by borrowing from the Central Bank, and partly by
foreign borrowing, both of which tended to aggravate
the size of the external payments deficit.
As regards the external sector, a range of policies were
pursued to encourage export diversification and
import substitution - some representing a con-
tinuation of policies which were in place well before
1975. Initially, the main instrument of protection was
a highly differentiated tariff structure, which set very
high tariffs on consumer - and particularly luxury
goods, and very low rates on capital and
intermediate goods. After 1975, however, when the
serious shortage of foreign exchange set in, GRZ
established an elaborate system of import licensing
and foreign exchange allocation. Every import
required a licence from the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, and a foreign exchange allocation from the
Bank of Zambia. In practice the system grew complex
and unwieldy. Allocations of foreign exchange and of
licences were often arbitrary as between different
industrial branches, and between different firms in the
same branch. The impact of the overall shortage of
foreign exchange was, therefore, often exacerbated by
inefficiencies and delays in its allocation.
The exchange rate, fixed by GRZ, was gradually
reduced after 1975. By 1982 it had fallen to
Table 6
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approximately two-thirds its level (relative to the US
dollar) of the mid-l970s (Table 6). Domestic inflation,
on the other hand, was high during these years - the
CPI increased by about 150 per cent over the period.
Thus - at least relative to the mid-1970s - the
Kwacha appeared to become increasingly overvalued.
A symptom of this was the development of a parallel
market, where the unofficial exchange rate was
considerably lower than the official rate.
Unfortunately, therefore, these circumstances served
to decrease the incentives to export, or to manufacture
import substitutes, as compared with the early 1970s.
In response to the high, and rising, inflation rate, GRZ
increased the administrative regulation of consumer
prices, and extended the subsidies on basic com-
modities. One result of these controls, however -
combined with the inefficiencies in foreign exchange
rationing and associated shortages of raw materials
and spare parts - was reduced profitability of
domestic industry and a further contraction of
investment and maintenance expenditures. Large
sections of industry were operating at less than full
capacity (some sources put average capacity utilisation
during the early l980s no higher than 30 per cent),
whilst transport and marketing bottlenecks prevented
the effective distribution of those commodities which
were available. Exchange rate overvaluation also
provided few incentives for 'non-traditional' exports.
A symptom of this is that whilst copper production fell
from 33 to 15 per cent of GDP between 1970 and 1983,
its share of exports declined hardly at all; meanwhile,
Average Annual Kwacha/Dollar Exchange Rates and Inflation: Selected Years
Note: From October 1985 onwards the value of the Kwacha was determined at a weekly auction of foreign exchange. Wide
fluctuations took place during 1986. The value shown is the average value obtaining in the months July-September.
Further deterioration took place. The lowest value reached is that shown for April 1987. As from May 1987 the
auction was suspended, and the Kwacha's value was pegged at $0.125 IJS. CPI figures for 1987 are for the month of
January. High Income index for January 1987 calculated on basis of Low Income index (assuming increase over
1986 was the same proportion in both cases).
Sources: World Bank 1986a, Bank of Zambia 1985 and Central Statistical Office.
agricultural exports fell to almost zero over the period.
By consequence these measures did little or nothing to
ameliorate the situation. On balance they made
matters significantly worse. Although imports were
increasingly held back - falling by two-thirds in real
terms between 1974 and 1983 (Table 4) - the
sustained decline of the copper price implied a
continuation of serious current account deficits
throughout the period. These continued to be financed
by borrowing. Contraction of medium and long-term
public and publicly guaranteed external loans
increased from an annual average of US$235 mn in
1975-77 to almost $700 mn in 1979 and 1980. In 1981
and 1982 they averaged just over $400 mn -
increasingly from non-concessional, private sources
with the terms of such lending gradually hardening.
Accordingly, debt service obligations mounted
sharply. In 1974 debt service payments had
represented less than 8 per cent of export earnings, and
had risen to 20 per cent by 1978-81. But by 1983, debt
service obligations due were estimated at US$550 mn.
or 52 per cent of export earnings, exclusive of arrears
of almost US$1 bn. This situation was untenable and
necessitated GRZ reaching urgent agreement with its
major creditors on debt-rescheduling, on new finance,
and on the conditions that would be attached to such
resource flows.
Economic Reforms 1983-87
From around 1981 there had been signs of policy
change on the part of GRZ. This reflected the
frequency of negotiations with the IMF, as Zambia's
balance-of-payments problems intensified. Finance
was provided by the Fund in 1978 and 1981, from its
upper tranche facilities, which involved the acceptance
by GRZ of a range of stabilisation measures. All were
not, however, implemented, and the failure to meet
performance targets led to a cancellation of the 1981
Stand-by by the Fund in the following year.
As indicated, however, by 1983 Zambia had become
more dependent upon securing agreement not only
with the Fund but with the aid community as a whole.
In particular the process of reaching accommodations
with the World Bank and the IMF had become
interdependent. The Bank was increasingly the most
visible and articulate of the aid agencies. Its
documentation and analysis of the problems con-
fronting Zambia was extensive and persuasive. Many
bilateral agencies appeared willing to follow the
Bank's lead, and be strongly influenced by its
interpretation of Zambian policy requirements and
performance. Increasingly the aid community insisted
that the government should introduce significant
economic reforms if their finance were to assist a
process of recovery rather than simply postponing
further decline.
In response to these pressures, and following a
protracted dialogue with the Fund and the World
Bank, the government was persuaded to introduce a
far-reaching set of economic reforms which were
believed capable of achieving structural change and
diversification of the economy and a reduction in its
dependence on foreign exchange. These reforms were
discussed at the World Bank-sponsored Consultative
Group meetings in 1984, where they received the
support of the wider donor community, and pledges of
additional financial assistance. Their main elements
were: exchange rate devaluation of 60 per cent, which
resulted over the two years ending in July 1985 in a
40 per cent real depreciation of the Kwacha;
reductions in government spending - expenditure on
consumer subsidies and capital items were cut and a
freeze on recruitment to the administrative cadre of
the public service was introduced; the level of taxation
on mineral exports was increased. These measures
were strengthened by approximately $400 mn of debt
re-scheduling on the part of the government's
creditors. In addition, a range of policy reforms was
announced in each of the mining, agricultural and
industrial sectors, aimed at improving their efficiency
and output. Rehabilitation loans to each of these
sectors were announced by consortia of donors, and
made conditional on the policy reforms being
implemented.
During 1984 a new Stand-by credit of SDR 225 mn
had been agreed with the IMF. But in early 1985
drawings were suspended after only SDR 80 mn had
been used. Once again, performance criteria could not
be satisfied - in particular the pace of exchange rate
depreciation was less rapid than the IMF wished;
furthermore, GRZ was unable to maintain interest
payments and had proved unwilling to reduce
consumer subsidies to the extent previously agreed.
Negotiations on these and other matters continued
during 1985. In October, however, the government
introduced a series of radical measures that eventually
succeeded in winning IMF support: interest rates were
decontrolled and agricultural producer prices were
substantially raised; the centrepiece of the new
measures, however, was the introduction of a weekly
auction of foreign exchange and the abandonment of
import licensing. Henceforth the exchange rate was
determined by market forces - on the basis of the
price set by the marginal bid which succeeded in
exhausting the week's offer of foreign exchange. These
radical reforms were strongly favoured by the IMF
and by the aid community more generally. In
February 1986 a two-year Stand-by Arrangement with
the IMF was announced whereby SDR 229.8 mn would
be made directly available, with a further SDR 68.8 mn
at hand under the Compensatory Financing Facility.
The IMF agreement was quickly followed in March
1986 by arrangements to reschedule $500 mn of debts
with the 'Paris Club' group of official creditors.
57
58
with GRZ, the sharp changes in policy which were
imposed also brought very significant costs for many
groups within Zambia. These costs tended to be
underplayed in the analysis of the effects of
liberalisation - yet, in the event, proved strong
enough to undermine, and eventually to reverse, the
movement for reform. At this stage, analysis is
hampered by the fact that data on sectoral production,
balance of payments and government finances are not
yet available for 1985/86 and 1986/87. It is not
therefore possible to analyse the short-run impact of
the 1985 reforms upon the major macroeconomic
aggregates. Nevertheless it appears clear that the
major reasons for the eventual reversal of policy which
took place in 1987 were two-fold. First, the radical
change in the distribution of income imposed by the
auction pauperised significant sections of the
community, and imposed strains on the political
system which proved impossible to bear. Second, the
unwillingness of the aid community to increase
concessional resource flows to Zambia significantly,
meant that the logic for reneging on earlier debt
repayment agreements became increasingly attractive.
Each of these points are addressed in the remainder of
this article.
The Labour Market. In a simple primary-goods
exporting economy like Zambia, where the price of
exports is fixed in terms of foreign exchange, and
where most intermediate goods are imported, a
judgement that the exchange rate is overvalued is
basically synonymous with a view that real wages are
too high. A devaluation increases the returns, in
domestic currency, to exporters and to producers of
import-substitutes. But these increased returns are
dependent upon wages and salaries not rising to
compensate fully for the increased domestic prices
imposed by devaluation. A judgement, therefore,
about the extent to which nominal depreciation will be
capable of increasing the profitability of tradeables
production is crucially dependent upon the
assumptions made about the willingness of the labour
force to accept cuts in their standard of living.
Conditions in the Zambian labour market had been
deteriorating for some years. Formal employment in
1984 was some 10 per cent lower than it had been in
1975. This had been associated with a rapid rise in
unemployment rates in the urban centres. Youth
unemployment, in particular, appears to have
increased massively (rates of 24-28 per cent are
reported by the 1980 census for those aged 15-25 years
in urban centres). By 1986 these levels of unemploy-
ment would undoubtedly have increased still further.
Those who had been lucky enough to retain, or find, a
formal sector job, have also had to accept sacrifices.
Although high and rapidly rising wage rates exerted
great pressure on consumption and imports for some
years, the peak in real earnings came around 1970,
after which formal sector workers experienced large
Effects of the Reforms
The impact of the liberalisation measures adopted in
October 1985 was far more profound than those of any
of the earlier policy reforms introduced since 1983.
This was mainly because of the dramatic change in the
exchange rate - and hence in the relative prices of
traded, compared with non-traded, goods. In
September 1985 the exchange rate had been K2.2 per
US dollar. After the auction it fell to K5, and
continued to fall steadily thereafter - reaching K14
per dollar by December 1986.
The radical increase in the price of imports, and in the
Kwacha returns from export production which
followed the auction, very sharply increased the
profitability of producing agricultural and manu-
factured goods. As regards agriculture the shift
towards more market-oriented pricing policy (since
1983) had coincided also with a run of good weather.
Nevertheless the extent of output response does
suggest that earlier pricing policies had contributed
heavily to the long period of stagnation in Zambian
agriculture. It appears that value added in agriculture
increased by about 8 per cent per year between 1982/3
and 1984/5, with production of wheat, coffee and soya
bean increasing between three and eight fold, and that
of sunflowers and maize doubling, as compared with
production levels of 1979. The Budget Speech of
February 1987 [GRZ 1987] reported further major
increases in production in 1985/86. Maize output
increased by 40 per cent over the preceding year, with
self-sufficiency in the staple food being achieved.
Further large production increases were also recorded
for groundnuts, rice, wheat, millet, sorghum and soya
beans.
A similarly strong response is reported from various
sources for the manufacturing sector. Over the year
following the inception of the foreign exchange
auction, capacity utilisation increased from less than
40 per cent to about 55 per cent, factor productivity
increased sharply, as did manufacturing value added
- by up to 15 per cent. The Minister of Finance
observed that shortages of foreign exchange continued
to constrain production owing to inadequate input
supplies. But the tone of the Budget Speech remained
bullish, as regards the future growth of manufacturing.
There were, of course, many profound problems
which continued to inhibit output in both of these
sectors, covering the whole spectrum of production
support (technique, inputs, transport, marketing, etc.)
but it would be churlish not to accept that - in the
context of these constraints - price liberalisation had
a strong positive impact upon output. Supply
elasticities appeared to be quite high, even in the
short-run.
Whilst, at one level, these developments appear to
vindicate the line taken by the TMF/World Bank, and
by the rest of the aid community, in their negotiations
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declines in real incomes. This is true for all sectors of
the economy. Government basic starting salaries in
1983 were less than half their real 1975 levels for the
more skilled groups (Table 7). Although the fall was
less sharp for the unskilled groups, they too suffered a
10 per cent decline in real earnings between 1975 and
1983. These trends accelerated between 1983 and 1985,
with the real incomes of all but the lowest paid
government workers dropping to below one-third of
their 1975 levels. Similarly large declines in real
earnings have been experienced by parastatal
employees, the mining sector workers, and for most of
those in the private sector as well. Even these cuts,
however, were modest relative to the impact of the
currency auction system, after October 1985, on levels
of domestic inflation, and upon further declines in real
wages. During 1986 and early 1987 prices increased by
about 65 per cent, which compared with a 40 per cent
increase in nominal earnings for most workers.
Further cuts in real incomes of about 25 per cent were
therefore incurred by most of those working in the
formal sector during 1986. Zambia had, throughout
the 1970s, remained a high wage economy in
comparison with surrounding countries. Declines in
wage costs were necessary, therefore, if industriali-
sation was to have much chance of being successful.
But the speed and severity of the fall in the value of real
earnings was so great that even early in 1986, it seemed
inevitable that these welfare losses would prove
unacceptable to large sections of organised labour.
It can be argued, then, that the major problem with the
adjustment imposed on the economy by the auction
was its speed and severity - and that some degree of
real wage adjustment was both inevitable and
overdue. The downward pressure upon other incomes,
however, which the reductions in public expenditure,
increasing unemployment and declining real wages set
in train, gave separate and substantial cause for
concern. A survey of low income households in
Lusaka, for example, showed that the majority of poor
households had, in 1986, significantly changed the
composition of their diets since the auction of foreign
exchange began [UNDP 1986]. In particular, the
quantity of more expensive, high protein foods which
had previously been bought fell, and was often
substituted by mealie meal. Some of the very poorest
households had also reduced purchases of staples.
Female-headed households faced special poverty
problems since they were often dependent upon a
single, irregular income source. More generally,
incomes in a large part of the informal sector were
threatened by the adjustment, largely because of the
sharply declining incomes of wage and salary earners,
on whom informal sector workers often depended for
their market. These circumstances, together with
rapidly rising levels of urban unemployment as civil
servants and mining workers were laid off, implied an
increase in the incidence of serious poverty and
deprivation in the urban centres. Opposition to the
adjustment measures, when it came, would clearly not
be confined to waged or salaried workers alone.
Trade Prospects and External Capital. During 1986
Zambia's trade account worsened considerably,
primarily because copper prices declined further, and
cobalt prices fell by 50 per cent. This prompted a
reassessment of prospects for future trade recovery,
which looked considerably more bleak than before.
Total annual external capital requirements were
projected (by both GRZ and the World Bank) to rise
from about US$400 mn in 1986 to close to $1 bn in
1987 - considerably more than total export receipts.
More than three-quarters of these financing require-
ments were generated by interest and principal
repayment obligations on foreign debt. Both the
absolute and relative importance of debt service
obligations were projected to rise each year to 1989.
Under these circumstances, even generous assumptions
for the amount of new external capital likely to be
available were dwarfed by the amounts needed by
Zambia to pay back its debt.
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too late. Investment fell much more sharply and
quickly than consumption, and external borrowing
increased massively. This reduced its ability, at a later
stage, to adjust via growth, since a large part of export
revenues had already been pre-empted by debt service
obligations.
Aid agencies were justified in attaching conditions to
their resource flows, because GRZ policy did need to
change. Unfortunately, however, they were the wrong
conditions. Specifically the Fund and the Bank (and
by implication, all other CG members) pushed
Zambia too hard and too fast. The extent to which
they pauperised the wage earning classes, and pushed
many at the fringes of the formal economy into
starvation and destitution almost guaranteed that the
reforms would become untenable. The speed and
extent of enforced structural change was greater than
the fabric of the polity would allow. Kaunda - faced
with circumstances on external account where things
could hardly deteriorate further - had little to lose,
and much domestic popularity to gain, by turning his
back on the IMF.
It is too early yet to identify the likely economic impact
of the new measures. A key variable in the country's
short-run prospects is the reaction of the aid
community. Severance of all aid inflows has not
happened, but a sharp cut-back appears to have
occurred. A return to a price-control, subsidy and
import licensing regime of economic management
may contain the political pressures, but is unlikely to
improve diversification prospects. On the other hand,
this may be more likely if the exchange rate of K8 to
the dollar (which retains greater incentives for export
as compared with the rate pre-1986, notwithstanding
subsequent inflation) is held.
The main lessons of this recent history are, however,
for the aid community. They underline the enormous
risks of pushing a country farther and faster than its
social and political framework will allow. The costs
can be measured in lost economic opportunities for
years to come - and, more harshly and directly, in
lost human lives.
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Rejection of Reform
By the end of 1986 the impact of the auction on levels
of domestic inflation was causing GRZ increasing
concern. The Consultative Group meeting, held in
Paris in December, was immediately preceded by
extensive rioting in the copperbelt towns following an
attempted doubling of the price of maize-meal by the
government, as part of its commitment to remove
consumer subsidies. These events had an undoubted
impact upon the resolution of the government to
proceed in the ways suggested by the IMF and other
lenders. In spite of the government's stated
commitments to maintain existing reforms, a series of
sharp changes in economic policy soon followed the
meeting of the Consultative Group. At the end of
January 1987 the price of the Kwacha was pegged, in a
range of K9-K 12.50 per dollar - to be determined,
within that range, by auction bids. However, early in
February the weekly auctions were postponed
pending further discussions with the IMF and the
World Bank. Following these discussions in late
March a two-tier exchange rate system was
announced. The first, covering official aid trans-
actions, debt servicing, and the procurement of
medical and educational supplies would be within the
range of K9-K12.50 per US dollar. All other
transactions were to be determined by the auction, as
before.
Political difficulties re-emerged, however. The auction-
determined rate for the Kwacha continued to fall
sharply; strikes by increasing numbers of workers, and
criticism of the harshness of the adjustment measures
became more frequent. Price rises appeared to
accelerate weekly, and the exchange rate fell to K21
per US$1 in late April. On 1 May President Kaunda
announced that negotiations with the IMF were ended
forthwith, and that the reform programme was
suspended. The currency auction was discontinued,
and a fixed rate of K8 to the dollar was imposed. Debt
service payments would henceforth be limited to
10 per cent of export earnings net of the foreign
exchange needs for mining imports, the Airways, fuel
and fertiliser imports. Interest rates were cut by
five per cent and price control was re-introduced.
This, then, represented a return to the old policy
regime.
Conclusion
The Zambian adjustment story has classic features. Its
adjustment imperatives were externally determined -
caused by massive deterioration in the price
commanded by its only significant export. In view of
adverse external conditions, where access to grant
monies could not bridge the gap, the government
reacted to its fall in reserves and revenues too little and
